

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 2 pages.  
No. 1 of 10 copies. Series A.

November 15, 1958

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S *mm* F.D.K.

FROM: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

SUBJECT: Ambassador Grewe's Call Concerning Berlin  
Scheduled for November 17 at 11:30 a.m.

Discussion

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 901029  
LHR-M/SG, NARA, Date 4/12/91

The German Ambassador wishes to talk to you about the threat posed to Berlin by Khrushchev's speech of November 10. He will be carrying out instructions to approach the Department at the highest possible level to express the deep concern of the Federal Government at the implications of the Khrushchev statement. He may wish to discuss our plans for dealing with possible contingencies in Berlin and indicate that his Government has not been informed in any detail about the steps we plan to take in an emergency. He may refer to press stories that we are prepared to deal with East Germans under certain circumstances. He may ask what we plan to do in case the Soviet member withdraws from the Berlin Air Safety Center. He may also seek your views on Khrushchev's speech to the graduates of Soviet military academies. (On November 14

Mr. Hillenbrand, Director of German Affairs, will accompany Ambassador Grewe. A memorandum of the Ambassador's conversation with the Under Secretary on Berlin November 12 is at Tab B.

Recommendations

In talking with the German Ambassador you may wish to:

1. Re-emphasize our support of Berlin.
2. If Grewe asks about the Saturday press stories on possible dealings with East German officials, reply that we are proposing to the British and French that our contingency plan concerning Berlin be discussed with the German Government at the highest level. (See Department's telegram No. 1002 to Bonn attached at Tab A.)

FYI. A tripartite contingency plan was approved by the British, French and United States in 1954 but never shown to the Germans because of British and French opposition and for security considerations. The plan contemplates applying the "agency theory" under certain limited circumstances if GDR personnel replace Soviet personnel at certain check points. END FYI

3. Stress

~~SECRET~~

EUR: GER: GPA: ET *Lampson*; *edw*  
NND 901029-38

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

3. Stress the importance of countermeasures -- especially in the economic field -- as demonstrating a determination to defend Berlin because:

a. the Soviets are more impressed by acts than verbal protests; readiness to cut off steel shipments to East Germany, for example, would be an impressive proof we put Berlin above normal commercial interests;

b. a demonstration of the Federal Republic's readiness to take concrete retaliatory steps would be an important element in the total western response; (a brief press statement on the German position is at Tab C)

c. failure of the Federal Republic to demonstrate its resolve by concrete steps might confuse both the Soviet Union and western public opinion.

4. If the Ambassador asks about Soviet withdrawals from BASC, <sup>\*</sup>reply it is your understanding BASC can operate without Soviet participation and we intend to continue its operations without interruption even if the Soviet member withdraws.

5. If queried on the latest Khrushchev speech, reply by commenting that the fact that Khrushchev has raised the Berlin issue twice in ten days indicates we are probably in for a systematic and protracted campaign of pressures against Berlin. It is hard to anticipate the tempo and intensity of this campaign but we must prepare ourselves for coming difficulties.

Concurrence

NJH GER  
Mr. Hillenbrand

Attachment

1. Department's telegram No. 1002 to Bonn (Tab A).
2. Memorandum of Ambassador Grewe's conversation of November 12 with Under Secretary.

3. Press statement on German position (Tab C).

ETH  
EUR:GER:GPA:ETLampson:cmv  
11-15-58

< Berlin Am. Rep. 7/6/58

~~SECRET~~

901029-39